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JOINT, TOTTEN TRUST, AND P.O.D. BANK ACCOUNTS: 
VIRGINIA LAW COMPARED TO THE UNIFORM PROBATE 
CODE.t 
J. Rodney Johnson* 
Litigation involving the survivorship rights of parties to joint ac-
counts has been before the Supreme Court of Virginia on ten occa-
sions since 1955.1 These ten cases, plus one older one, 2 constitute all 
of Virginia's case law on this subject. Instead of attempting a chron-
ological analysis of the development of this case law, it is proposed 
to state such rules as now exist and compare them with the results 
that would be obtained under the new Uniform Probate Code. 3 In 
addition, attention will be focused on the statutes that deal with the 
rights of parties and financial institutions in deposit accounts to see 
how they compare with their counterparts under the UPC. Finally, 
an attempt will be made to explore certain omissions in Virginia's 
law and to see what relief the UPC might provide. 
JOINT ACCOUNTS 
The law is now settled in Virginia that two persons :qi.ay open a 
t Preparation of this article was facilitated by a grant from the Committee on Faculty 
Research of the University of Richmond. 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. Member of the Virginia Bar; 
B.A., William and Mary, 1965; J.D., William and Mary, 1967; LL.M., New York University, 
1970. 
I. Robbins v. Grimes, 211 Va. 97, 175 S.E.2d 246 (1970); Campbell v. Campbell, 211 Va. 
31, 175 S.E.2d 243 (1970); Cooley v. Cox, 209 Va. 811, 167 S.E.2d 317 (1969); Haynes v. Hurt, 
209 Va. 447, 164 S.E.2d 671 (1968); Wilkinson v. Witherspoon, 206 Va. 297, 142 S.E.2d 478 
(1965); Stevens v. Sparks, 205 Va. 128, 135 S.E.2d 140 (1964); Quesenberry v. Funk, 203 Va. 
619, 125 S.E.2d 869 (1962); Johnson v. McCarty, 202 Va. 49, 115 S.E.2d 915 (1960); Wrenn 
v. Daniels, 200 Va. 419, 106 S.E.2d 126 (1958); King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d 
141 (1955). 
2. Deal's Adm'r. v. Merchants and Mechanics Sav. Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91S.E.135 (1917). 
3. The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (hereinafter cited as UPC) was approved by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the American Bar Association 
in August, 1969. In addition to influencing recent legislation in Maryland and Wisconsin, it 
has been adopted virtually intact in Idaho, Alaska, Arizona (effective January 1, 1974) and 
North Dakota (effective July 1, 1975). It was introduced as legislation in Colorado, Michigan, 
and Texas in 1972, and it either has been introduced or will be introduced as legislation in 
the following states in 1973: California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Straus, Is 
the Uniform Probate Code the Answer? 111 TRUSTS & ESTATES 870 (Nov., 1972); 4 UPC NOTES 
5 (March, 1973); 5 UPC NOTES 1, 3 (June, 1973). 
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deposit account in such a way that they will be regarded as joint 
owners so long as the both of them shall live, with the survivor 
taking the balance on hand at the death of the other.4 These ac-
counts may be divided into four separate categories for the purposes 
of convenient treatment. The first category deals with accounts 
opened in what might be classified as a "short-form" designation. 
For instance, the account might be opened in the form of "A or B, 
and subject to the check of either of us or the survivor", 5 "A or B or 
survivor", 6 "A and Bas joint tenants with right of survivorship, and 
not as tenants in common", 7 or the deposit contract might provide 
that the deposit is owned "jointly, with right of survivorship and be 
subject to the check or receipt of either of them or the survi-
vor .... "8 In all of these "short-form" cases, regardless of whether 
dealing with a savings account in a bank9 or savings and loan asso-
ciation10 or a checking account in a bank, 11 the quoted language, 
standing alone, has not resulted in the incident of survivorship at-
taching. 
Survivorship has been abolished between joint tenants in Virginia 
by a statute12 that has been held applicable to deposit accounts. 13 
While another statute creates an exception to this rule ". . . when 
it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was 
intended the part of the one dying should then belong to the oth-
ers", 14 the court has felt that the language quoted in the "short-
form" cases above has failed to meet the test of this exception. The 
court has, however, recognized the possibility that one might trans-
fer a beneficial interest in such an account on the theory of a com-
mon law gift. 15 Here, though, the presumption has been made that 
4. Wilkinson v. Witherspoon, supra note 1. 
5. King v. Merryman, supra note 1. 
6. Wrenn v. Daniels, supra note 1. 
7. Stevens v. Sparks, supra note 1. 
8. Quesenberry v. Funk, supra note 1. The Court does not supply the quoted language in 
its decision but it was before the Court in Record No. 5419 at page 3. 
9. King v. Merryman, supra note 1; Quesenberry v. Funk, supra note 1, and Stevens v. 
Sparks, supra note 1. 
10. Stevens v. Sparks, supra note 1. 
11. Stevens v. Sparks, supra note 1; and Wrenn v. Daniels, supra note 1. 
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (1950). 
13. King v. Merryman, supra note 1. 
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-21 (1950). 
15. King v. Merryman, supra note 1. 
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the one despoiting the funds did not intend to make a gift to his 
cotenants, but instead created the account for his own conveni-
ence, 16 that is, the one furnishing the funds for the deposit merely 
wished to put his cotenant in a position where the cotenant, acting 
as agent, could obtain funds from the joint account for the deposi-
tor. This presumption of convenience is said to become stronger if 
the depositor is ill or infirm at the time of creating the account. 17 
Of course this presumption may be rebutted by the surviving tenant 
establishing that the subjective intent of the depositor was to make 
a donative transfer to him. In the resolution of this factual issue, 
parol evidence is admissiable to show the true intent of the deposi-
tor, 18 and, if the surviving tenant testifies, the hearsay rule is relaxed 
and ". . . all entries, memoranda, and declarations . . . (of the 
depositor) relevant to the matter in issue may be received as evi-
dence."19 The outcome of the cases in this "short-form" category, 
then, will depend on the resolution of a factual issue in each 
case-the subjective intent of the depositor. 
The second category of cases deals with accounts opened in what 
might be classified as a "long-form" designation. When the first of 
these cases arose in 1965, it caused the court to remark that ". . . 
never before, in the cases coming before us, have we encountered 
language in a signature card as conclusive as (this) .... " 20 There, 
in addition to the account card containing the ordinary language of 
"joint tenants with right of survivorship," the card contained the 
following language which the court classified as "crucial":21 
. . . [I]t is agreed by the signatory parties with each other and by 
the parties with you that any funds placed in or added to the account 
by any one of the parties is and shall be conclusively intended to be 
a gift and delivery at that time of such funds to the other signatory 
party or parties to the extent of his or their pro rata interest in the 
account. . . (Emphasis in original)22 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Quesenberry v. Funk, supra note 1. 
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-286 (1950). 
20. Wilkinson v. Witherspoon, supra note 1, at 301. 
21. Wilkinson v. Witherspoon, supra note 1, at 304. 
22. Id. 
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Although the court stated that the quest was still for the true 
intent of the depositor, as it was in the "short-form" cases, the court 
went on to hold that in the face of such express language of intent 
contained in the account card in these "long-form" cases, the pre-
sumption of convenience adopted in the "short-form" cases would 
"pale."23 Following what it referred to as a "contract-theory," to 
distinguish those previous cases that had been decided on the com-
mon law gift theory, the court announced that since the language 
adopted by the depositor in these "long-form" cases is a clear mani-
festation of intent on his part that the account should belong to the 
cotenant on the death of the depositor, the requirements of Va. Code 
Ann. § 55-21 (Repl. Vol. 1969) 24 are satisfied, and the incident of 
survivorship attaches to the account without the necessity of 
supplying external evidence of intent. 25 
There is one fairly recent case26 that fails to fit neatly into either 
of the two categories described above. The account designation in 
Colley u. Cox would cause it to be classified as "short-form" due to 
the absence of the "crucial" language referred to above. In this case 
the court stated that "[o]ur decision here is controlled by King u. 
Merryman . .. " 27 which was the case in which the court recognized 
the common law gift theory with its attendant presumption of con-
venience. However, the court, in Colley, went on to hold that" ... 
under the facts of this case the presumption never comes into play. 
The rights of the parties here must be determined by the rules 
pertaining to the interpretation of contracts."28 Although the court 
recognized that if the presumption had come into play the testi-
mony relied upon by the surviving cotenant to rebut it " . . . would 
be persuasive ... " 29 , the court concluded that: 
23. Wilkinson v. Witherspoon, supra note 1, at 305. 
24. This is the section requiring that the intent to have survivorship must "manifestly 
appear" from the tenor of the instrument in order to escape the statutory abolition provided 
for in VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (1950). 
25. While the court, in Wilkinson, did go on to note that the evidence before it was 
consistent with an intent to make a gift, in the next two cases to be decided on the contract 
theory, Campbell v. Campbell, supra note 1, and Robbins v. Grimes, supra note 1, the <;ourt 
disposed of the issue on the basis of the deposit card language alone. 
26. Colley v. Cox, supra note 1. 
27. Colley v. Cox, supra note 1, at 815. 
28. Colley v. Cox, supra note 1, at 814. 
29. Id. 
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In the absence of such intention (to create a right of survivorship), 
manifestly appearing, either from the tenor of the instructions given 
to the bank at the time the deposit was made, or in the form of the 
deposit, no survivorship account was created.30 
Whether this case represents a temporary departure from the pre-
viously established gift theory, whether it represents a complete 
abandonment of the gift theory in favor of the contract theory, or 
whether it merely adds another requirement to the gift theory, viz., 
that the intent to make a gift must be disclosed to the bank upon 
creation of the account, is uncertain. 
The third category of cases deals with accounts which, although 
in "short-form" designation, consist of funds belonging to both of 
the tenants rather than to one alone. In such a case, instead of the 
presumption of convenience being applicable, no presumption ex-
ists in favor of either tenant, and the burden of proving that the 
deceased tenant deposited his funds in the account for his conveni-
ence only falls on those claiming through him.31 
The fourth category of cases deals with joint accounts between a 
husband and wife that are payable to either, or payable to the 
survivor. In this class of cases, statutes provide that the balance on 
hand at the death of the first to die shall vest in the surviving spouse 
if the account happens to be in a bank,32 trust company,33 or in-
dustrial loan association.34 However, there are no corresponding 
statutes in those sections of the Virginia Code dealing with joint 
accounts in savings and loan associations or credit unions. Since the 
Virginia Supreme Court has held that in the absence of a statutory 
presumption, succession to the balance of a joint account depends 
on the intent of the depositor,35 it would seem that these latter cases 
(joint accounts between husband and wife in a savings and loan 
association or a credit union) would have to fall into category one, 
absent the use of a long form card. It should be much easier to 
30. Colley v. Cox, supra note 1, at 817, 818. 
31. Haynes v. Hurt, supra note I. 
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-73 (1966). 
33. The Virginia Banking Act is expressly made applicable to trust companies by VA. CODE 
ANN. § 6.1-4 (1966). 
34. Industrial Loan Associations are made subject to the Virginia Banking Act by VA. CODE 
ANN. § 6.1-228 (1966). 
35. King v. Merryman, supra note I. 
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overcome the presumption of convenience in these cases because of 
the special relationship between the parties. 36 Thus, this statutory 
discrepancy in the treatment of identical deposits, in different fin-
ancial institutions, will probably cause no harmful consequences 
other than putting the surviving spouse to the necessity of proving 
intent as a condition precedent to having a right to withdraw. It 
does serve, however, to point up a lack of consistency between these 
articles, that has no apparent justification for existing. 
TOTTEN TRUSTS 
In order to illustrate a statutory discrepancy in the deposit ac-
count area that does make for different results, we might consider 
the following case: Tom, Dick, and Harry are good friends who have 
each inherited $10,000 and each of them, having no present need of 
the funds, decides that he would like to place his money in such a 
way that he could be assured of having access to it for the remainder 
of his life and the balance on hand at his death would pass to his 
son. As the men discuss their common desire, one mentions a maga-
zine article he has just read that describes a Totten trust.37 As he 
explains it, this device seems to fit their needs perfectly, and the 
next day each of the men goes to a financial institution and opens 
an account in the form of "Father, in Trust for Son." The next week 
Tom, Dick, and Harry are killed in a boating accident. Their sons, 
who are each sixteen years old, go to their fathers' financial institu-
tions to claim their Totten trust accounts and find that (1) Tom, 
Jr., whose father opened his account in a credit union, can immedi-
ately withdraw the $10,000, even though he is a minor;38 (2) Dick, 
Jr., whose father opened his account in a savings and loan associa-
tion, must wait until he is eighteen years old in order to withdraw 
36. This statement assumes that parol evidence is still admissible to show the subjective 
intent of the depositor. See Quesenberry v. Funk, supra note 18. It further assumes that the 
holding in Colley, supra note 30, will not be followed literally. 
37. A trust created by the deposit by one person of his own money in his own name as a 
trustee for another and it is a tentative trust revocable at will until the depositor dies or 
completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration such as delivery of 
the pass book or notice to the beneficiary and if the depositor dies before the beneficiary 
without revocation or some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance the presumption arises 
that an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor. 
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1682 (4th ed. 1951). 
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-207 (1972). 
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his $10,000 without the intervention of a guardian;39 and (3) Harry, 
Jr., whose father opened his account in a bank, may not get any-
thing, at any time.40 
Although it is possible to offer an argument in favor of any one of 
these three results, the average person might consider it indefensible 
that all three exist and that the determination of which applies in 
any given case revolves around the character of the financial institu-
tion in which the deposit is made, rather than the character of the 
deposit itself. This is true especially when there is a complete ab-
sence of any advance warning to the unwary depositor. Even if he 
inquires at his financial institution, it is doubted that the average 
employee will be aware of this inconsistency. Instead of these stat-
utes accomplishing a desirable social end, then, they represent a 
potential source of real injustice. 
P.O.D. ACCOUNTS 
Suppose, in the above case, that Tom, Dick, and Harry had each 
gone to his respective financial institution and opened the accounts 
in question in the following form: "Father, payable on death to 
Son." What result now, assuming again the deaths of the depositors 
while their sons are minors? When Harry, Jr., whose father depos-
ited his funds in a bank, inquires about his rights, he will learn that 
the bank has the power to turn over the $10,000 to him immediately, 
if it wishes too, even though he is a minor.41 However, while the bank 
will be protected if it pays Harry, Jr., immediately, he does not have 
any right to require the bank to make payment to him without a 
judicial determination that he is the present owner. While the stat-
ute provides that a P.O.D. account "vests" in a P.O.D. beneficiary 
who is a surviving spouse, 42 in all other cases the statute merely 
provides that the bank "may" pay the balance on hand to the 
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.23 (1972). 
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-73.1 (1972). The operative language of this ambiguous section 
reads as follows: 
(U]pon the death of the trustee, if such deposit does not exceed five thousand dollars 
(it) may be withdrawn by the beneficiary, if he is eighteen years of age or over, without 
the intervention of a guardian. 
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-77 (1966). 
42. Id. This is the only instance in the Code where a positive statement is made concerning 
succession to a P.O.D. account. 
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P.O.D. beneficiary, whose receipt, even though a minor, will be a 
release for the bank. 43 
When Dick, Jr., whose father deposited his funds in a savings and 
loan association, inquires about his rights, he also will learn that he 
has no right of withdrawal from the P.O.D. account, absent a judi-
cial determination that he is the present owner. Even if the savings 
and loan association is willing to pay over the $10,000 to Dick, Jr., 
it must wait until sixty days44 have passed from the death of Dick, 
Sr., or it will lose the protection of the statute.45 
When Tom, Jr., whose father deposited his funds in a credit 
union, inquires about his rights, he will learn that there is no statute 
in the Code dealing with P.O.D. accounts in credit unions, not even 
a protective statute for the credit union that is willing to pay in the 
absence of a court order vesting the $10,000 in Tom, Jr. Thus, Tom, 
Jr., seems to have no recourse except to turn to the courts. 
Here again it is assumed that one could make an argument justi-
fying the result in any of these three cases. But surely one cannot 
justify different treatment among the three cases purely because of 
the different nature of the financial institutions involved. 
Assuming, arguendo, that these conflicting results should be 
eliminated, one possible way to achieve consistency would be by 
harmonizing the many existing code sections. Although this would 
settle the immediate problem at hand, it would not begin to assist 
in the resolution of the many potential conflicts that can arise in 
areas where there is no existing law to harmonize, such as, for exam-
ple, the rights of parties to joint accounts during their lifetimes.46 
43. Id. In passing on this same form of permissive language contained in the predecessor 
of VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-72, the court has held that "[I]t is manifestly for the protection of 
the bank and not declaratory of the rights of the depositors in the fund as between them-
selves." King v. Merryman, supra note 1, at 850. 
44. This sixty day waiting period is eliminated if the P.O.D. beneficiary is a surviving 
spouse. 
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.30 (1972). 
46. There is no case law and only two statutes that deal with the rights of parties to joint 
accounts while both parties are alive. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-73 (1966) provides that, in the 
absence of any specific order of the court involved, upon the delivery of a certified copy of a 
divorce decree to a bank, the interest of the parties is transformed from a joint tenancy to a 
tenancy in common. There is no comparable section for savings accounts in savings and loan 
associations or credit unions. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.26 (1972) provides that when two or 
more persons open an account in a savings and loan association that provides for withdrawals 
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UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
Another way to eliminate the present conflicts that would also fill 
the vacuums that now exist as well as update this branch of Vir-
ginia's law would be by adopting Article VI of the Uniform Probate 
Code, entitled Non-Probate Transfers.47 Part 1 of Article VI deals 
with "multiple party accounts" which are defined to be joint ac-
counts, 48 P.O.D. accounts, 49 and Totten trust accounts, 50 when used 
for non-business purposes.51 The definition encompasses all types of 
deposits, whether checking, savings, certificate of deposit, share 
account, or other like arrangement,52 so long as the deposit is made 
in an "organization authorized to do business under state or federal 
laws relating to financial institutions."53 
to be made by either or the survivor ". . . such savings account shall be vested in such 
persons as joint tenants . . .". 
If a true joint tenancy does exist in any of these joint account cases, there is a resultant 
gift tax exposure for the depositor if the value of the interest that passes to his cotenant 
exceeds the amount of the $3,000 annual exclusion. 26 CFR 25.2511-l(e) and 25.2511-l(h)(5). 
The creation of a true joint tenancy would also leave the original depositor vulnerable in an 
action of conversion brought by his cotenant if the original depositor should withdraw over 
one-half of his deposits. See Surrogate Nathan R. Sobel's discussion of New York law in Joint 
Property: Its Virtues and Vices (panel discussion), 111 TRUSTS & ESTATES 446 (June 1972). 
47. The official policy statement of the UPC's Joint Editorial Board declares that "[t]he 
ultimate objective of the Uniform Law Commissioners and others who support the Uniform 
Probate Code is the uniform adoption of the Code in all states. Adoption of parts of the Code 
is approved in states in which a pragmatic decision suggests that this is a necessary step 
toward the ultimate goal." 1 UPC NOTES 2 (July, 1972). 
48. UPC 6-101(4). The section provides that a joint account is "an account payable on 
request to one or more of two or more parties whether or not mention is made of any right of 
survivorship." 
49. UPC 6-101(10). The section provides that a P.0.D. account is "an account payable on 
request to one person during lifetime and on his death to one or more P.0.D. payees, or to 
one or more persons during their lifetimes and on the death of all of them to one or more 
P.O.D. payees." 
50. UPC 6-101(14). While the UPC is dealing with the traditional Totten trust account, it 
refers to such an account simply as a "trust account" which means "an account in the name 
of one or more parties as trustee for one or more beneficiaries where the relationship is estab-
lished by the form of the account and the deposit agreement with the financial institution 
and there is no subject of the trust other than the sums on deposit in the account." The 
definition goes on to specifically exclude "regular" trust accounts and fiduciary accounts. 
51. UPC 6-101(5). Specifically excluded from this category are "accounts established for 
deposit of funds of a partnership, joint venture, or other association for business purposes, or 
accounts controlled by one or more persons as the duly authorized agent or trustee for a 
corporation, unincorporated association, charitable or civic organization." 
52. UPC 6-101(1). 
53. UPC 6-101(3). This section provides in part: 
[i]ncluding, without limitation, banks and trust companies, savings banks, building 
and loan associations, savings and loan companies or associations, and credit unions. 
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The first section of Article VI consists of fifteen definitions which 
are included in order to eliminate a number of questions that might 
arise due to the many forms of multiple party accounts that exist. 
Several of these definitions have already been noted and more will 
be referred to later as specific matters are treated. 
After settling this basic definitional matter, the UPC proceeds to 
announce a division of its following sections into two groups and to 
specifically provide that there is no interrelation between the two 
groups.54 Group one contains the rules that are applicable in deter-
mining the rights of the parties, 55 P.O.D. payees, Totten trust bene-
ficiaries, their successors and credits as among themselves, 56 while 
group two contains the rules that are applicable in determining the 
rights of these persons vis-a-vis the financial institution.57 This sep-
aration is intended to result in maximum flexibility as between 
those using these types of accounts in order that they may achieve 
a variety of results, while insuring that the financial institution has 
the absolute certainty needed in order to be able to protect itself at 
all times.58 
OWNERSHIP DURING LIFETIME 
Having thus charted its course, the UPC begins by dealing with 
ownership rights in multiple party accounts during the lifetime of 
the parties. Turning first to joint accounts, the UPC rejects the 
concept of a present joint tenancy. Instead, acting on the assump-
tion that when one creates a joint account he ordinarily does not 
intend a gift, in praesenti, of any interest in the deposit, 59 the UPC 
provides that, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary, a joint account belongs to the parties in proportion to their 
"net contributions" thereto. 60 The UPC deliberately omits any pro-
vision for those cases where the parties are unable to establish the 
amount of their net contributions. The drafters believed that, under 
these circumstances, the court would ordinarily divide the account 
54. UPC 6-102. 
55. UPC 6-101(7). A party is one who has a present right of withdrawal. 
56. UPC 6-103 to 6-105. 
57. UPC 6-108 to 6-113. 
58. Official Comment to UPC 6-102. 
59. Official Comment to UPC 6-103. 
60. UPC 6-103(a). 
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balance equally. However, the drafters were apprehensive that a 
specific rule requiring this result might have the undesirable effect 
of limiting one in his attempt to prove partial contributions as well 
as involving potential gift tax liability.61 
These same rules would also apply where two or more depositors 
create a P.O.D. account. For instance, if John and Mary open an 
account in the form of John and Mary Jones, P.O.D. Sam Jones, 
then so long as John and Mary keep this deposit their rights, inter 
se, will be determined the same as any joint account. Where the 
account is opened by one party, e.g., "John Jones, P.O.D. Mary 
Jones", the account of course belongs to the depositor during his 
lifetime. The P. 0 .D. payee(s) never have a right of withdrawal while 
an original payee is alive. 62 
Similarly, a Totten trust account belongs to the depositor/trustee 
during his lifetime and not to the beneficiary. If there are multiple 
trustees then, again, their rights, inter se, will be determined by the 
provisions dealing with joint accounts. This section of the UPC also 
recognizes the possibility of creating an irrevocable trust, either by 
the terms of the account or other clear and convincing evidence, in 
which case the account would belong to the beneficiary immedi-
ately.63 
While these rules governing the rights of the parties during the 
lifetime of all the parties are relatively simple and are thought to 
carry out the intent of the average depositor, they do not in any way 
affect the rights of the financial institution involved.64 
SURVIVORSHIP RIGHTS 
The Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized that joint accounts 
are sometimes referred to as a "poor man's will" due to their fre-
quent use for the purpose of eliminating the need for a will. 65 This 
fact of life has also been recognized by the draftsmen of the UPC 
who have made the assumption that, although most individuals 
using joint accounts do not intend to transfer any immediate benefi-
61. Official Comment to UPC 6-103. 
62. UPC 6-103(b). 
63. UPC 6-103(c). 
64. See note 79, et seq., infra. 
65. King v. Merryman, supra note 1. 
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cial interest in the account to the non-depositing cotenant, they do 
intend the survivor to have the balance on hand at the death of the 
first to die. 66 Accordingly, it is provided that, in the absence of clear 
and convincing evidence to the contrary at the time a joint account 
is created, "[s]ums remaining on deposit at the death of a party 
to a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as against 
the estate of the decedent."67 In those cases where there may be 
more than one survivor, e.g., "John and Mary and Alice," and John 
dies, then Mary and Alice will continue to own their previous shares 
in proportion to their net contributions, and each will also succeed 
to an equal share of the decedent's interest. The right of survivor-
ship will then continue on between Mary and Alice. 68 
While the ordinary P.O.D. account will normally involve only two 
persons, the UPC takes into account the possibility of there being 
two or more original payees as well as two or more P.O.D. payees. 
For instance, an account could be taken out in the form of "Tom 
and Dick and Harry, P. 0 .D. John and Ken and Larry." If there are 
multiple original payees, then there is survivorship among them the 
same as described with ordinary joint owners. After the death of the 
last original payee, the balance on hand in the account vests in the 
P.O.D. beneficiaries alive at this time. Assuming that there are 
multiple P.O.D. beneficiaries alive at this time, the account vests 
in them equally, and, in the absence of a term in the deposit agree-
ment or account designation expressly providing for the contrary, 
there is no longer any right of survivorship among them. In other 
words, there is survivorship among P.O.D. beneficiaries during the 
lifetime of the original payees, but when the account vests in the 
P.O.D. payees upon the death of the last original payee, the incident 
of survivorship ceases to operate. 69 
The survivorship aspect of Totten trust accounts is treated in the 
same manner as P.O.D. accounts, insofar as the parties are con-
cerned, that is, the incident of survivorship obtains as between mul-
tiple trustees. However, instead of an absolute vesting in the surviv-
ing beneficiaries upon the death of the last surviving trustee, the 
UPC provides that there will be such a vesting "unless there is clear 
66. Official Comment to UPC 6-104. 
67. UPC 6-104(a). 
68. Id. 
69. UPC 6-104(b). 
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and convincing evidence of a contrary intent."70 Lastly, it is pro-
vided that there is no survivorship as between beneficiaries, after 
the account vests in them upon the death of the last trustee.71 The 
UPC does not contain any presumption of survivorship in this latter 
case for the same reason that it omits the presumption in the P.O.D. 
cases. Since, in the ordinary case, neither the beneficiaries nor the 
P.O.D. payees will have participated in the creation of the account, 
there is no justification for a belief that they would want the inci-
dent of survivorship to attach.72 
While the draftsmen of the UPC believed that most persons would 
want the incident of survivorship to attach, they realized that this 
desire would not be universal. Thus, provision is made for the use 
of an account form that negates any intent that survivorship at-
tach. 73 This power to negate an intent that survivorship exist may 
be exercised upon opening the account or any time thereafter. It 
must, however, be exercised during the lifetime of the creator of the 
multiple party account because the question of survivorship will be 
determined by the form of the account at the time of his death. In 
order to affect a change in the form of an account, the financial 
institution must receive a written order during the lifetime of the 
party requesting the change.74 Moreover, it is specifically provided 
that rights of survivorship, Totten trust beneficiary designations, 
and P.O.D. payee designations cannot be changed by a will.75 
This survivorship feature of multiple party accounts will un-
doubtedly reduce the need for a will in a number of instances and 
it is because of this use as a will substitute that the next problem 
arises. Courts have sometimes refused to give effect to survivorship 
accounts because they viewed these transactions as essentially tes-
tamentary and thus defective since not created in accordance with 
the formalities prescribed by the Statute of Wills. 76 In order to pre-
vent such a holding in the adopting states, the UPC expressly pro-
70. UPC 6-104(c). 
71. Id. 
72. Official Comment to 6-104. 
73. UPC 6-104(d). 
74. UPC 6-105. 
75. UPC 6-104(e). 
76. T. ATKINSON, WILLS 40 (2d ed., 1953). 
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vides that the multiple party accounts contemplated by it are not 
to be considered as testamentary.77 
While the UPC insulates these multiple party accounts from 
claims that they are testamentary, insofar as the Statute of Wills is 
concerned, it is recognized that what is involved is a transfer that 
doesn't occur until the death of a party. As a consequence of this 
realization, the transfer of a party's interest, pursuant to the survi-
vorship feature, is ruled ineffective to defeat the rights of the dece-
dent's creditors, of every description, ifthe other assets of his estate 
are insufficient to discharge all valid claims. A transferee liability 
is created against any successor in interest to a multiple party ac-
count, in favor of the decedent's personal representative. This trans-
feree liability is in the amount necessary to discharge the claims 
involved, or the amount passing to the successor in interest, which-
ever is less. The personal representative has no authority to assert 
this transferee liability unless he receives a demand in writing from 
a creditor within two years of his decedent's death, and then only 
after all the remainder of the deceased party's estate has been ex-
hausted. Lastly, it might be noted that the initiating creditor does 
not thereby obtain any priority in the recovery since the UPC pro-
vides that any sums recovered are treated as a part of the decedent's 
estate for purposes of administration. Here again, it might be well 
to emphasize that this is an inter partes conflict which does not 
represent any exposure for the financial institution involved. A fin-
ancial institution has no liability for paying over to a successor in 
interest, pursuant to the terms of the account, unless it has been 
served with process prohibiting such payment.78 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION PROTECTION 
Having thus attended to the rights of the parties, their successors 
in interest, and creditors generally, the UPC next turns its attention 
to the protection of the financial institution and begins by noting 
that although the substantive rights of the parties, inter se, are 
determined by their respective net contributions, the financial insti-
tution has neither a duty to make inquiries concerning the source 
of funds offered for deposit in a multiple party account nor a duty 
77. UPC 6-106. 
78. UPC 6-107. 
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to query any party making a withdrawal as to its application in 
order to establish the parties' net contributions. 79 It is expressly 
provided that the financial institution may pay all or any part of 
the account to any of the parties at any time, and such payment will 
be a complete discharge for the amounts paid regardless of whether 
or not the withdrawing party may thereby be wronging his fellow 
parties. 80 The only instance in which the financial institution is not 
protected is if it pays over to a party after having received written 
notice from another party to stop payment.81 "No other notice or any 
other information shown to have been available to a financial insti-
tution shall affect its right to the protection provided here. "82 In 
addition to these general rules, the UPC has specific sections pro-
viding protection for the financial institution when dealing with the 
several forms of the multiple party account. 
Looking first to the area of joint accounts, one notes that the 
financial institution is always protected when paying to a party, 
even though the other parties be deceased83 or under an incapacity 
at the time of such payment. However, the financial institution is 
not protected if it pays over to the heirs or personal representative 
of a deceased party unless the incident of survivorship has been 
negated, as previously discussed, 84 or unless the heirs or personal 
representative involved present proof of death establishing that 
their decedent was the last surviving party to the account. 85 
The balance in a P.O.D. account may safely be paid to any origi-
79. UPC 6-108. 
80. UPC 6-112. 
81. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-195.26 (1972) and 6.1-208.2 (1968), dealing with joint accounts 
in savings and loan associations and credit unions, respectively. Each provides that where a 
party issues a written stop payment order, the financial institution may refuse, without 
liability, to honor another party's withdrawal request while the parties are determining their 
rights. Under existing Virginia law, then, the financial institution is protected whether it 
chooses to honor the stop payment request or not, whereas the UPC would not protect the 
financial institution that chose to ignore a stop payment request properly made by any of 
the parties. There is no comparable section in the Virginia Code that deals with this problem 
if the account is in a bank or trust company as opposed to a savings and loan association or 
a credit union. 
82. UPC 6-112. 
83. To this extent the Virginia law concerning joint accounts is in accord with the UPC. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-72 (1966), banks and trust companies; 6.1-195.26 (1972), savings and 
loan associations; § 6.1-208.2 (1968), credit unions. 
84. Supra note 73. 
85. UPC 6-109. "Proof of death" requires no more than a death certificate. UPC 6-101(9). 
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nal payee at any time. The financial institution may also safely 
make payment to a P.O.D. payee upon his presentation of proof of 
death establishing the death of all original payees.86 If the P.O.D. 
payee fails to withdraw all of the funds during his lifetime, the 
financial institution must require his heirs or personal representa-
tive to present proof of death establishing the fact that the P.O.D. 
payee survived all the original payees in order to guarantee the 
safety of payment to such claimants. In the event that all the 
P.O.D. payees predecease the original payee, he of course can with-
draw the account at any time during his life, and the financial 
institution is protected upon paying to his personal representatives 
or heirs upon presentation by them of proof of death establishing 
that their decedent survived all other original payees as well as all 
P.O.D. payees.87 
The financial institution's position, when faced with a request for 
a withdrawal from a Totten trust account, is much the same as in 
the P.O.D. cases just discussed. Payment can safely be made to any 
trustee during his lifetime. So also, the personal representative or 
heirs of a deceased trustee can be safely paid upon their presenta-
tion of proof of death establishing that their decedent survived all 
other trustees as well as all beneficiaries. The financial institution 
acquires full protection on payment to any beneficiary if he presents 
proof of death establishing that all trustees are deceased. 88 
As a last measure of protection, the UPC recognizes a right of set-
off in all cases where a party to a multiple party account is indebted 
to a financial institution. The amount of this set-off is limited to 
that portion of the account to which the debtor is, or was at the time 
of his death, beneficially entitled. This, as we have seen, is depen-
dent upon the net contributions of the party involved. However, in 
order to prevent the financial institution from being defeated due 
to a lack of evidence as to the sources of the deposits, it is presumed 
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-77 (1966), protects the bank that pays the balance in such an 
account to the P.O.D. beneficiaries on the death of the depositor. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.30 
(1972) protects the savings and loan association that pays the balance in such an account to 
the P.O.D. beneficiaries after waiting for sixty days after the death of the depositor. There is 
no comparable section dealing with P.0.D. accounts in credit unions. 
87. UPC 6-110. 
88. UPC 6-111. Those sections of the Virginia Code dealing with Totten trusts, see notes 
38-40 supra, are not cast in terms of "bank protection." Instead, they deal with the rights of 
the beneficiaries of these accounts. 
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that all parties having a present right of withdrawal own in equal 
shares for purposes of this set-off. It is then up to the other parties 
to the account to prove that their net contributions are larger, if that 
is the case. Since this is intended by the UPC to be a cumulative, 
as opposed to an exclusive, remedy for the financial institution, it 
is provided that the granting of this remedy does not qualify any 
other statutory liens nor does it qualify any contractual provision 
agreed to by the parties. 89 
While the UPC's treatment of multiple party accounts may seem 
to exhaust all possible uses of accounts as will substitutes, the 
draftsmen of the UPC recognized that it is possible to have a num-
ber of contractual agreements concerning passage of property at 
death and that among these agreements may be found accounts 
other than multiple party accounts. In the past such agreements 
have regularly been struck down as being testamentary in nature 
and failing to comply with the Statute ofWills.90 Drawing on experi-
ence gained from the use of multiple party accounts, revocable liv-
ing trusts, and U.S. government bonds, the draftsmen determined 
that the specter of fraud that some see looming in the distance if 
the Statute of Wills is not strictly enforced in this area is really an 
illusory peril. 91 Therefore, Part 2 of Article VI specifically provides 
that a provision in any deposit agreement that the balance is to be 
paid to someone named in a writing, whether on the account or 
separate, and whether made concurrently with the deposit or later, 
is deemed to be nontestamentary.92 
CONCLUSION 
As previously noted,a great deal of interest is being shown in the 
UPC on the national level. 93 This display of interest is due to the 
realistic solutions offered by the judges, lawyers, and academics who 
89. UPC 6-113. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.26 (1972), establishes the validity of a pledge of 
a joint account to a savings and loan association, when made by any party. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 6.1-206 (1968), gives a lien on the account of any depositor as security for the deposi-
tors obligations to the credit union. The common law banker's lien or right of set-off is 
recognized in Virginia. Reserve Bank v. State Bank, 150 Va. 423, 143 S.E. 697 (1928). 
90. Tucker v. Simrow, 248 Wis. 143, 21N.W.2d252 (1946). 
91. Official Comment to UPC 6-201. 
92. UPC 6-201. 
93. See note 3 supra. 
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spent some six years working on the great variety of troublesome 
problems that exist in the probate area. It is suggested that the 
solutions offered in the field of multiple party accounts would im-
mediately eliminate the existing conflicts and vacuums in Virginia's 
law as well as making this law correspond more closely to the expec-
tations of the average depositor. 
